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5.1.1 General Motivation
The Finnish wage bargaining system has remained roughly unchanged
over the last ﬁfty years. Encompassing wage settlements were used as early
as 1950 to 1951 to contain the inﬂationary pressures set oﬀ by the Korean
war boom. In the 1960s, such cooperation between the labor unions, em-
ployer organizations, and the state was established on a more systematic
basis. From 1969 onward, the unions and the employer organizations have
formally negotiated wage agreements that cover the vast majority of work-
ers. The government has also been actively involved in wage bargaining,
and the wage settlements have often included various nonwage issues such
as working hours, family policies, unemployment insurance, and pension
arrangements.
Thus, and in contrast to the experience of some other countries, the
Finnish wage policy has in some sense remained “centralized” up to the
present. Yet this “centralization” has always been of a rather limited na-
ture: throughout the post–World War II years, the centralized agreements
have had to do with the general pace of wage increases, as well as minimum
wage levels associated with speciﬁc tasks. Relative wages, however, have
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and suggestions.because the economic literature on wage coordination has been so incom-
mensurately colored by the Swedish experience of the 1960s and 1970s. In
that extremely solidaristic phase of Swedish pay bargaining, centralization
came to be synonymous with an attempt to steer the entire structure of rel-
ative wages by collective regulations. That phase was transient even in Swe-
den, but outside commentators do not often realize that such centralistic
wage policies were never nearly as strong in the other Nordic countries. In
the following, we shall outline the ﬁne print of Finnish pay bargaining in
more detail.
The balance between centralized and industry-level agreements has
stayed roughly unchanged over time. Perhaps a more signiﬁcant change is
that various ﬁrm-speciﬁc arrangements have become more common dur-
ing the 1990s. For example, proﬁt-sharing arrangements and productivity-
related pay systems have become popular during the latter part of 1990s.
Indeed, one important conclusion of this chapter is that this largely un-
changed pay bargaining system has been able to accommodate large eco-
nomic restructuring and upheavals. While the wage bargaining system has
remained quite stable, the macroeconomic environment within which the
ﬁrms operate has been extremely unstable. The Finnish economy entered
its largest peacetime recession in the beginning of 1990s. The unemploy-
ment rate rose from 3.2 percent in 1990 to almost 17 percent in 1994. Real
gross domestic product (GDP) declined in four consecutive years. In 1991
alone, real GDP dropped by 6.4 percent. The recovery after the recession
was also rapid. The average GDP growth rate between 1994 and 2000 was
4.4 percent.
The bust-boom cycle was also associated with a large reallocation of re-
sources across industries and across ﬁrms within industries. These macro-
economic shocks aﬀect all statistics on wage growth and worker mobility re-
ported in this chapter. The post-Depression years have been associated with
extremely high productivity growth in some ﬁrms and industries and a large
reallocation of labor and capital to the growing electronic industry sectors.1
Thus, and in contrast to the common “from centralized to individual”
narrative of pay bargaining, we argue that such binary simpliﬁcation is
misleading in the Finnish case: collective and individual elements have al-
ways been present in a pay bargaining system that has accommodated im-
portant structural changes.
Against this institutional background, this chapter presents an econo-
metric analysis of the wage structure in Finnish manufacturing industries.
The empirical material presented in this chapter comes entirely from the
manufacturing industry. Thus, we cannot lay claim to a complete repre-
sentativeness of the Finnish labor market. On the other hand, we have at
our disposal the complete wage and salary records of all manufacturing
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1. This has been analyzed in detail by Mika Maliranta (Maliranta 2003).ﬁrms of at least twenty-ﬁve employees from 1980 through 2002. This
means that we can carry out fairly detailed and reliable analyses on the spe-
ciﬁc questions that we want to address. Furthermore, as is the case with en-
compassing register data, sampling problems can be completely ignored,
and statistical characterizations of the data apply directly to the universe
of wage and salary earners.
Being part of an international comparative project on wage structures,
this chapter uses the data material in two ways. The same distinction is re-
ﬂected in the structure of the chapter.
First, we have computed the comparative tables on wages for Finland, ac-
cording to the commonly agreed blueprint of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (NBER) project on wage structures. To this end, we use 
the data on the entire Finnish manufacturing workforce for 1981, 1990, and
2000. Our data material, however, come from two separate sources, one for
blue-collar hour-wage earners and another for salaried employees remu-
nerated on a monthly basis. These comparative table computations required
that these separate records be merged. This merging of blue-collar worker
ﬁles with salaried employee ﬁles yields new insights and makes the tables
more comparable to those of other countries, but it is also cumbersome and
involves nontrivial decisions that are to some extent arbitrary, as the statis-
tical framework for entering employee information diﬀers between workers
and salaried employees. The former group is remunerated by the hour,
whereas the salaried employees command a monthly salary. Furthermore,
these groups are covered by very diﬀerent collective agreements and job
classiﬁcation systems.
That is why the other part of the chapter focuses on the group of salaried
employees only. To compensate for this loss of generality, we provide a much
more detailed analysis of these employees’ wage structure in 1980 through
2002. In particular, we describe the changing role of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc fac-
tors as well as the career patterns of individuals.
5.1.2 Structure of the Chapter
The structure of the chapter is as follows. We start by providing a more
detailed account of the Finnish collective agreement system and other pay-
bargaining institutions. This discussion provides an institutional back-
ground against which many of the results reported in the chapter become
intelligible.
We then move on to describe the data sets that we have used for this proj-
ect. As explained in the preceding, these data encompass the entire Finnish
manufacturing workforce for 1980 to 2002. For 1981, 1990, and 2000, we
have merged the blue-collar and salaried employee ﬁles and computed the
basic comparative tables motivated in the introductory part of this volume.
We also brieﬂy discuss the broad picture that emerges from these tables, in
particular as to how the Finnish results compare with other countries.
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salaried employees’ wage structure. In particular, we show how the last ten
years have meant a gradual increase in the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc fac-
tors in pay determination. We also provide quite detailed estimates of indi-
vidual mobility across ﬁrms and tasks and characterize individual careers
as a function of promotions and employer changes. The concluding section
discusses the interplay of collective agreements and individual bargaining
in the light of the main results and speculates on the future course of pay-
bargaining institutions.
5.2 Wage-Setting Institutions
As in the other Scandinavian countries, union density is high in Finland.
Union density increased quickly in the 1960s and has been trending up-
ward after that, reaching 82 percent in 1992. Since then, a slow decline has
taken place, so that the unionization rate was by 2004 about 70 percent (see
Böckerman and Uusitalo 2006).
The Finnish pay bargaining system is often characterized as centralized,
but such a one-dimensional depiction is misleading, as wage setting in Fin-
land is a mixture of collective and individual mechanisms. It is actually very
hard to ﬁnd an employee of a privately owned ﬁrm whose salary would be
directly determined by some collective agreement or other collective inter-
vention. A more accurate description would be to say that pay bargaining is
local, but pay increases are coordinated by collectively agreed general wage
increases, and, furthermore, there are minimum pay levels for the diﬀerent
occupational categories, as set out in the diﬀerent collective agreements.
There is no minimum wage legislation.
More precisely, the collective constraints put on the local bargaining
consist of two elements. First, unions in each industry have established
minimum tariﬀ wages for occupational categories and job levels. Thus,
when a ﬁrm hires an employee and bargains with him or her about the ini-
tial salary, both local parties are bound by these minimum tariﬀs. Most
workers and employees of the manufacturing sector are, however, paid
more than these minimum levels, so that these minimum tariﬀs are seldom
directly binding.2
Second, in each bargaining round, the collective parties—that is, an in-
dustrial union and its corresponding employer association—agree on a
general wage increase that is as a general rule applied to all workers, re-
gardless of their initial wage. This increase is called the “general increase,”
and it is most often deﬁned in percentage terms, although the blue-collar
unions and their central federation have in most bargaining rounds sought
152 Roope Uusitalo and Juhana Vartiainen
2. Of course, they can indirectly aﬀect the bargaining outcome even if the actual wage ex-
ceeds the minimum tariﬀ wage.to establish a minimum money increase as well, so that the lowest wages
would, in fact, be increased relatively more than other wages.3
It is important to understand that the general increase is not a binding
constraint for the local parties if they both are prepared to deviate from it.
Of course, nothing prevents a ﬁrm from increasing an individual’s wage by
more than the general increase. On the other hand, if the ﬁrm ﬁnds its jobs
threatened, it can initiate negotiations on lower pay increases or even pay
cuts. If the local parties can agree on such an outcome, they are in general
free to do so. The exact legal signiﬁcance of the general increase is that an
industrial peace clause is associated with it: once the union has signed a
new collective agreement, the workers have relinquished their right to un-
dertake strikes or other industrial actions. Similarly, the ﬁrms whose em-
ployer association has agreed on a general increase cannot anymore initi-
ate lockouts or other conﬂictual actions.
Thus, the local parties can in principle deviate from that general wage in-
crease, but a deviation requires the consent of both parties. Consequently,
the general wage increase is in most cases rather mechanically applied to
each person’s wage. In that sense, the unions can eﬀectively inﬂuence the
speed of wage increases. The ﬁrms, on the other hand, can eﬀectively aﬀect
the local wage structure: when recruiting a new worker, the wage can be set
according to the ﬁrm’s own personnel policy, as long as the wage exceeds
the minimum tariﬀ listed in the relevant collective agreement.
To sum up, the Finnish wage bargaining system, although centralized as
to the determination of wage increases, has not been an instrument that
would determine the entire structure of relative wages. Rather, its main and
stated objective has been to control the average rate of wage growth while
leaving relative wages to decentralized, plant-level, or individual decision
making.
The general increases are formally negotiated at the industry level, be-
tween the worker and the employer organizations. Collective agreements
cover even nonunion members in the sectors where at least half of the em-
ployers belong to an employer organization. In practice, this implies that
95 percent of the workers in Finland are covered by the union contracts.
The central labor market organizations have no binding mandate for
bargaining on behalf of their members associations. However, most bar-
gaining rounds have started with negotiations between the central em-
ployer and employee confederations, creating a high degree of de facto co-
ordination in the individual union contracts. The union bargains have then
been negotiated, taking as a starting point the wage increases agreed upon
in the central agreement. There has been considerable variation in the de-
gree of centralization between the diﬀerent bargaining rounds. During the
period 1980 to 2002, there have been six bargaining rounds (1980, 1983,
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3. This is currently a point of contention in the Finnish pay-bargaining debate.1988, 1994, 1995, and 2000) when no central bargain was reached and bar-
gaining occurred at the industry level.
The outcomes of centralized rounds and industry rounds diﬀer, but the
main diﬀerence is that decentralized rounds usually generate a higher av-
erage rate of wage increases. As we shall see, the variance of pay increases
across individuals does not radically diﬀer between those two institutional
outcomes. However, as shown in the following, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variance
component is more important when there is no centralized agreement. 
Thus, roughly, pay determination becomes slightly more ﬁrm- and industry-
speciﬁc when bargaining is at the industry level, but there is no explosion
in the variance of pay increases across individuals, and the main eﬀect is to
increase the average level of pay increases (see Uusitalo 2005). This is not
surprising, because the industrial unions are able to impose a general level
of pay increases on the ﬁrms of the industry, even if that general increase is
not coordinated by economywide organizations.
The comprehensiveness of centralized bargaining does not necessarily
imply a completely rigid structure of relative wages. The starting point for
all employee-employer relationships is, of course, a local bargain. As long
as a ﬁrm complies with the general increases, it can run its own personnel
policies. Wage drift, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between general increases and
average actual wage increases, has accounted for approximately 40 percent
of the wage growth between 1970 and 2000. This fraction has declined
somewhat over time, but wage drift still accounted for 35 percent of wage
growth in 1992 to 2000 (see Uusitalo 2005). The unions do not usually at-
tempt to constrain the growth of local or individual wages as long as the
minimum tariﬀlevels are met and the general increases (which often hardly
exceed the sum of inﬂation and average productivity growth) are applied.
Thus, even when complying with the general increases, ﬁrms that can sus-
tain a decent productivity growth rate do have at least some freedom as to
their internal wage structures. Some industries operate quite sophisticated
collective agreements that condition pay on the complexity of the task and
give the ﬁrm the right to adjust a person’s pay according to his or her indi-
vidual performance.4
Furthermore, various performance-related pay components have be-
come common. In 2000, more than half of the white-collar and about a
third of the blue-collar workers in the sample received some performance-
related pay components other than traditional piece-rate pay. On average,
these components were 4.4 percent of the total pay (see Snellman, Uusi-
talo, and Vartiainen 2003). For white-collar employees, the inclusion of
such performance-related pay elements into a total-compensation mea-
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4. The collective agreement of the Finnish metalworking industry, nowadays called “tech-
nology industry,” has such a sophisticated structure. It is described in some detail by Pekkari-
nen and Vartiainen (2006).sure imply a far higher likelihood of pay cuts than what an analysis of the
monthly salary would imply.
5.3 The Finnish Data Sets and Tables
5.3.1 The Wage and Salary Register of the 
Finnish Employer Association
The principal data source contains payroll records of all ﬁrms that re-
spond to the wage survey of the Confederation of Finnish Industry (TT). In
2000, these companies employed 500,000 employees, which is about a third
of all private-sector employees in Finland. Most TT members are large
ﬁrms in manufacturing and construction industries. The wage statistics
cover roughly 70 percent of all employees in these sectors. The data are used
to monitor wage growth in the manufacturing sector. The national statistics
on earnings growth in manufacturing and construction are based mainly on
these data. The data also serve as an information base for collective wage
bargaining between the unions and the employer organizations.
The TT gathers information on the blue-collar workers (who receive an
hourly wage) from the last quarter of each year and information on the
white-collar workers (who receive a monthly salary) from each December.
Answering the survey is compulsory for the member companies with more
than thirty employees and voluntary for smaller companies. The survey
gathers information on all employees of the ﬁrm. Only the top manage-
ment and those working abroad are excluded. In 2000, the data contain in-
formation on 255,000 blue-collar and 172,000 white-collar employees. The
records are stored at the individual level, and each individual is identiﬁed
by a personal identity code.
Currently, we have complete wage records for both the blue-collar and the
white-collar workers from 1980 to 2002. The last years of data (1996 to
2002) have been used previously by ourselves and by other researchers in
Finland. Data up to 1995 have previously been available only for a smaller
sample of individuals. Comprehensive data covering all employees and all
years have been used only recently, and only in a handful of mainly ongoing
studies. Therefore, not much is known about the quality of the data that
covers the 1980s and early 1990s. Also, previous analyses have mainly used
the white-collar and the blue-collar data separately. Combining white-collar
and blue-collar worker data using ﬁrm identiﬁers is possible for the later
years of data, but has not been previously done for the earlier period.
The wage records contain basic information on the employees and in-
clude details on all forms of compensation. The basic information on em-
ployees includes age, sex, job category, education, industry, occupation,
and tenure (date of entry). The variable structure of this information diﬀers
between the blue-collar and the white-collar employees. The diﬀerences are
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blue-collar workers and at the monthly level for the white-collar workers.
For both groups of workers, the wages or salaries are reported in 
great detail. The blue collar data contain wages and hours divided into
time-rate, piece-rate, and partial piece-rate (often also called “premium”
pay) pay schemes.5 Overtime pay, Sunday, and shift premiums, as well as
performance-related bonuses are reported separately. Most workers re-
ceive compensation in several diﬀerent forms (for example, some time-rate
pay, some piece-rate pay, and some overtime pay). For the purposes of this
chapter, we have deﬁned the wage as total compensation divided by total
hours. To make the white-collar workers data comparable, we have calcu-
lated the hourly wages based on the monthly wage and the usual weekly
hours also for the white-collar workers.
The register data also contain a ﬁrm code and a respondent code that re-
veals who provided the wage information. Most often this respondent code
refers to a plant. It is possible to create ﬁrm codes based on the respondent
codes, essentially combining the respondent codes that refer to the same
ﬁrm. For the last years of data, the procedure is reliable; for the early years,
we are less certain. The ﬁrm code and the plant code have at times been
subject to comprehensive registering changes, so that a certain amount of
detective work was necessary to create a continuous series of codes that
would allow the analysis of interﬁrm and interplant mobility.
5.3.2 Details on Variable Deﬁnitions and the Sample
In the tables based on the merging of blue-collar and white-collar em-
ployees ﬁles, comparable to the similar tables for the other countries in-
volved in the project, we chose to analyze three years of data, namely 1981,
1990, and 2000. The motivation is to cover as long a time span as possible,
skip the years that involve large changes in coding practice, and, at the
same time, choose years that are comparable in terms of the business cycle
(see ﬁgure 5.1 on macroeconomic conditions). To analyze wage growth and
entry rates, we calculate all statistics from year t – 1 to year t. For exits, we
calculate changes from the year t to the year t   1. Any restrictions on the
ﬁrm size (at least twenty-ﬁve employees) will refer to the base year t.
Some employees appear several times in the same year. This may hap-
pen, for example, if the employee changes ﬁrms during the observation pe-
riod or if he or she has several employers simultaneously. For these em-
ployees, we always select the observation that has the most hours and
discard the other observations on the same person. We also require that an
employee can be unambiguously identiﬁed and, therefore, delete any ob-
servations that do not have a valid personal ID number.
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5. Thus, the idea of premium pay schemes is that there is a ﬁxed base wage upon which a
production-related bonus is added.We calculate wages including all wage components (including bonuses,
overtime, etc.) and divide the total wages by total hours. For white-collar
workers, we calculate hourly wages dividing monthly wages by the average
number of weeks per month and further dividing the result by usual weekly
hours. All wages are deﬂated to year 2000 euros using the consumer price
index. To get rid of extreme observations (possibly errors), we delete all ob-
servations where the hourly wage is larger than three times the median or
less than a third of the median. This rather conservative trimming only
aﬀects approximately 0.5 percent of the employees but has a large eﬀect on
the estimates for the standard deviations.
We focus on full-time workers and, therefore, delete all observations
where the usual weekly hours are less than thirty. We make no restrictions
by worker status and retain, for example, trainees and workers with very
short contracts.
Only after doing all the data cleaning, we limit the sample to the ﬁrms
that have at least twenty-ﬁve employees. Imposing the size limit has little
eﬀect on our data because only the ﬁrms with more than thirty employees
(this varies slightly by industry) are required to answer the wage survey.
Note that in calculating statistics for the high-level and low-level jobs, we
make no additional restrictions to the sample. It is, therefore, possible that
a ﬁrm has only one high-level worker.
When computing the comparative tables on wage dynamics, we perform
similar data-cleaning procedures for year t – 1, with the exception that we
do not require that the ﬁrm had twenty-ﬁve employees in the previous year.
Nor do we impose any limits on the ﬁrm’s size for year t   1 in calculating
the exit rates. The wage growth for the workers that enter the ﬁrm as well
as the wage growth by tenure are naturally deﬁned using the information
on the date when the employer was hired to the current ﬁrm. In general, all
measures where the observation is a person are easy to deﬁne. In contrast,
the measures where the observation is a ﬁrm can be deﬁned in several ways.
For example, we have calculated the “average of ﬁrm average change in
wage” by calculating the ﬁrm averages in year t and t – 1, taking the diﬀer-
ence, and then the across-ﬁrm average of these diﬀerences. In this calcula-
tion, of course, the ﬁrm does not necessarily have the same employees in
both years. One could equally well calculate the average growth of wages
of individual workers by ﬁrm and then take the across-ﬁrm average, but it
is not clear how one should treat the employees that changed the ﬁrm be-
tween t– 1 and t. See the article by Lars Vilhuber (chapter 1 in this volume)
for a more detailed account of the variable deﬁnitions.
5.3.3 On Low-Level and High-Level Jobs
The register data also include an occupation code for each employee.
The new coding system also identiﬁes a level for each job, but the older
codes do not have such a hierarchical structure. There is also a code for the
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tries. These job categories are important for wage bargaining, as the union
bargains typically set a minimum wage for each job category. In this sense,
the job categories are ideal for the analysis of the wage structures because
they are deﬁned by the qualiﬁcations required for each job, and they are in-
dependent of the characteristics of the worker. Of course, these categories
are to some extent arbitrary: if the employer wishes to give a worker a raise,
he might promote a machinist to a senior machinist position without this
change in title implying any changes in the tasks.
Despite the appeal of the job categories, we chose to deﬁne high-level
and low-level jobs based on the occupation codes. The main reason is that
there is a lot less missing data on the occupation codes. We therefore cal-
culated the mean wage for each occupation code, sorted the data accord-
ing to these occupation mean wages, and deﬁned the employees who have
the occupation mean wage in the top 20 percent as being in high-level jobs.
In calculating entry and exit rates by quartiles and deciles, we ﬁrst calcu-
lated the relevant percentiles at each ﬁrm and selected the high- or low-
level jobs after that.
5.4 Macroeconomic Conditions
The Finnish economy has been characterized by rapid but volatile
growth, driven by export ﬂuctuations that have often been all but re-
inforced by domestic ﬁscal and monetary policy. The volatility of exports
is mostly due to the dominant position of a couple of manufacturing sec-
tors like wood and pulp, metal and engineering, and, a latecomer of the
1990s, the electronics sector spearheaded by Nokia. Growth rates and un-
employment rates are depicted in ﬁgure 5.1.
The 1990s were a particularly turbulent period. The unemployment rate
increased from 3.2 percent in 1990 to 16.6 percent in 1994. Real GDP de-
clined by 6.4 percent in 1991, and the recession continued during 1992 and
1993. Recovery from the recession was almost equally rapid. The average
growth rate for 1994 to 2000 was 4.4 percent, clearly higher than in other
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) econ-
omies. With disturbances this large, it is quite diﬃcult to ﬁnd a “typical”
year in terms of business cycle. Our choice of 1981, 1990, and 2000 does not
look too bad. In all these years, the unemployment rate remained almost
unchanged. In all cases, however, the unemployment rate grew in the fol-
lowing year, which might overstate the exit rates in the “normal” times.
To sum up, it is useful to bear in mind the following rough categorization
of the period under study when looking at the tables reported in this chapter:
• The ﬁrst part of the 1980s: A period of comparatively normal eco-
nomic growth
158 Roope Uusitalo and Juhana Vartiainen• Years 1986 to 1990: An overheated boom with unemployment near 3
percent
• Years 1991 to 1994: An exceptionally severe depression with yearly in-
creases of 4 to 5 percent in the unemployment rate and a wave of bank-
ruptcies
• Years 1995 to 1998: Rapid economic growth as resource use grew
again
• Year 1999 and onward: A normalization of economic growth with un-
employment stuck at around 9 percent
5.5 Discussion on the Comparison Tables
The comparison tables (see the comparative table section of this volume)
yield a picture of wage diﬀerentials that is broadly typical of a Nordic
country. For example, the wage dispersion entries of table 5.2 are quite sim-
ilar to the corresponding tables presented in the Sweden chapter. The av-
erage wage of the lowest decile is about 57 to 59 percent of the mean wage
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Fig. 5.1 Macroeconomic environment: GDP growth rates and unemployment rates
Source: ASTIKA database, Statistics Finland.in Finland, a couple of percentage points lower than in Sweden. This is not
unexpected in the light of the Swedish trade unions’ more ambitious egal-
itarian policies. The standard deviation of log wages is almost exactly the
same in the two countries.
We explained in the preceding that the bargains on wage increases have
been fairly tightly determined by collective agreements that set out a rec-
ommendation for general default wage increases. One would consequently
expect that the standard deviation of wage changes would be low in Fin-
land. The tables readily conﬁrm this picture. The standard deviation of 
the year-to-year change in pay is in the order of 0.10, clearly lower than in
Sweden, where the corresponding entry varies between 0.14 and 0.16—and
manifestly lower than in less neocorporatist countries like France, where
the standard deviation estimate is reported to vary between 0.29 and 0.34.
In other countries, like Germany and the United States, the corresponding
entries are even higher. Thus, whatever the merits or dismerits of this pat-
tern, we see clearly that the Finnish wage-setting institutions lead to fairly
uniform wage increases.
The mobility tables reveal fairly high mobility ﬁgures, like exit rates that
vary between 12 percent and 23 percent. Compared to the United States,
for example, these are high ﬁgures, and they do not shrink by much even if
we only look at high-level jobs. Similar ﬁgures emerge in our analyses of
salaried employees (see the following).
5.6 Salaried Employees: Decomposing Salaries
In this latter part of the chapter, we take a closer look at the variation of
pay in the group of salaried employees. We lose some generality by leaving
out hour-remunerated workers, but can instead carry out more detailed
analyses on employees. We exploit this by describing our variation mea-
sures and other statistics for all years 1980 through 2002.
In an assessment of the workings of a pay-bargaining system as com-
pletely steered by collective agreements, as is the case for Finland, an anal-
ysis of variance for ﬁrm eﬀects is a natural starting point. First, in tables 5.1
and 5.2, we report a variance decomposition for monthly salaries through
1980 to 2002.
We have taken, for each year, the individual log salaries of all full-time
salaried employees and projected it to the set of ﬁrm dummies. In the
tables, the ﬁrst column, “Raw wage (SD)” reports the standard deviation
of log salaries. The “between-R2” column reports the share of total vari-
ance explained by ﬁrm dummies.
The third and fourth column repeat the similar analysis, but, this time,
for log salary residuals after the original log salaries were projected on
three conventional Mincerian covariates: education, age, and gender. The
last column reports the number of ﬁrms used in the analysis of variance.
The decomposition is carried out separately for the 1980s and 1990s, as
160 Roope Uusitalo and Juhana Vartiainena comprehensive recoding of ﬁrms took place between years 1989 and
1990.6 The recoding implied, inter alia, that the number of ﬁrms tripled, so
that the ﬁrm coding became much less aggregated than what was the case
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6. We have analyzed this reorganization of the ﬁrm partition of the register and tried to use
plant code information to create a continuous time series of ﬁrm codes. Unfortunately, this
analysis did not reveal suﬃciently clear patterns of “linkages” between the old and the new
ﬁrm codes. Year 1989 was an overheated year in which a lot of splits and mergers took place.
These real economic changes are mingled with administrative reforms carried out within the
register. Consequently, we have no continuity in ﬁrm codes between 1989 and 1990.
Table 5.1 Variance decomposition for raw log salary and residual log salary for
ﬁrms (1980–1989)
Raw wage Between Residual  Between No. of 
Year (SD) R2 wage (SD) R2 ﬁrms
1980 0.36 0.03 0.25 0.04 548
1981 0.34 0.03 0.24 0.04 592
1982 0.34 0.03 0.24 0.04 654
1983 0.34 0.03 0.24 0.04 683
1984 0.34 0.03 0.24 0.04 695
1985 0.34 0.03 0.25 0.04 691
1986 0.34 0.03 0.25 0.05 691
1987 0.34 0.04 0.25 0.05 700
1988 0.34 0.04 0.25 0.05 748
1989 0.34 0.04 0.26 0.06 801
Notes: Monthly salaries, including all bonuses, of white-collar workers working full time in a
ﬁrm that belongs to the Confederation of Finnish Industry (TT). Residual wage refers to wage
dispersion after controlling for gender, age, and education. SD   standard deviation.
Table 5.2 Variance decomposition for raw log salary and residual log salary for
ﬁrms (1990–2000)
Raw wage  Between Residual Between No. of 
Year (SD) R2 wage (SD) R2 ﬁrms
1990 0.34 0.10 0.26 0.13 2,690
1991 0.33 0.10 0.25 0.13 2,702
1992 0.33 0.10 0.25 0.13 2,423
1993 0.32 0.10 0.26 0.12 1,404
1994 0.32 0.11 0.22 0.12 1,545
1995 0.32 0.13 0.22 0.15 1,532
1996 0.31 0.12 0.22 0.11 1,568
1997 0.33 0.20 0.22 0.16 1,593
1998 0.33 0.27 0.23 0.18 1,637
1999 0.33 0.27 0.23 0.19 1,601
2000 0.33 0.29 0.24 0.22 1,714
2001 0.33 0.30 0.24 0.22 1,699
2002 0.33 0.27 0.24 0.22 1,679
Note: See table 5.1.in the 1980s. Thus, it is hardly reasonable to draw inferences on the change
of the variance components between these two years and, in general, to
compare the analysis of variance (ANOVA) results for these two decades.
The situation is clearer for plant (establishment) codes, for which we were
able to construct a reliable and continuous time series for the entire time
span of 1980 through 2002.
We see, ﬁrst, that the across-ﬁrm variance is rather low to start with, in
comparison with similar analyses conducted on comparable data sets from
other countries (see the other chapters of this volume). The ﬁrm eﬀects
only explain a paltry 3 to 5 percent of salary variation in the 1980s.
Through the 1980s, not very much is going on in these variables: overall
salary variation is low and stays put, and mean wage diﬀerentials between
ﬁrms are almost insigniﬁcant and do not increase either. Such results
rhyme with the stylized facts of organized labor markets, as shown in other
papers like that of Holmlund and Zetterberg (see Holmlund and Zetter-
berg 1991): unexplained wage diﬀerentials are low.
In the 1990s, there is more action in these variables. The latter part of the
1990s deserves particular attention. That was a time of large migration be-
tween ﬁrms, associated with a rapid productivity growth and reallocation
of resources to the growing electronic industry (see Maliranta 2003). These
trends are probably reﬂected in the growth of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variance
component. However, we see that the increase in the between-ﬁrms com-
ponent is clearly larger for raw log wages than for residual log wages. This
observation is consistent with the hypothesis that employees are increas-
ingly allocated to ﬁrms that employ similar individuals: the highly edu-
cated work with highly educated, and the less-educated work with the less
educated. Similar empirical results have been reported by Michael Kremer
and Eric Maskin (1996), who also present a theoretical argument that ex-
plains the increasing sorting of similar skill levels into the same ﬁrms.
Another interesting result has to do with the ﬁrst column of tables 5.1
and 5.2: there is no growth in the aggregate variation of wages. Thus, to
sum up, we can say that wage diﬀerentials have not increased, but the
diﬀerences across ﬁrms are increasing, and this is only partly accounted for
by sorting between ﬁrms.
The next ﬁgure, ﬁgure 5.2, reports the results of the same exercise, com-
puted for establishments. The establishment codes generate a ﬁner parti-
tion of the employee material because one ﬁrm can consist of many estab-
lishments. Furthermore, there are no structural changes in the way the
establishments are coded throughout our investigation span of years 1980
through 2002. We can see similar trends: diﬀerentials between establish-
ments increased starkly in the buoyant recovery phase of the late 1990s,
and this is only partly accounted for by sorting. Figure 5.2 conﬁrms the idea
that the massive resource reallocation of the recovery phase of years 1995
to 1998 is a kind of structural break. The share of variance explained by es-
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a sharp turn upward. The explained variance share of salary residuals be-
haves in the same way, but the increase is less dramatic. Thus, again, we can
conclude that this period was one of increased sorting of workers to ﬁrms ac-
cording to productive capabilities, but, furthermore, between-establishments
salary diﬀerentials that cannot be explained by individual characteristics
increase as well.
5.7 Mobility between Firms and Establishments
We now turn to the incidence of employer changes and establishment
changes. Table 5.3 reports the relative frequencies of an individual chang-
ing ﬁrm or changing establishment.
Because the exit rates are an interesting variable in intercountry com-
parisons, it is important to be clear on the procedures used to obtain the
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Fig. 5.2 Variance decomposition of log wages and residual log wages: the share of
between- and within-ﬁrms components; monthly salaries, including all bonuses, of
white-collar workers working full time in a ﬁrm that belongs to the Confederation of
Finnish Industry (TT)data of table 5.3. The table is based on a simple criterion: an exit takes place
whenever the ﬁrm code or employer code of the individual changes from
the base year to the consecutive year. However, we have also checked that
those events are not based on potential code changes that aﬀect all the in-
dividuals of a ﬁrm. More precisely, for any “exiter” individual, say indi-
vidual i in ﬁrm j, we checked whether all the individuals in that particular
base year ﬁrm j were exiters. If that was the case, we checked whether one
could ﬁnd at least 80 percent of the base year individuals of that ﬁrm j un-
der some same but another consecutive year ﬁrm code k, and, furthermore,
whether these “old” individuals coming from j and now in k made up at
least 80 percent of ﬁrm k’s personnel in the consecutive year (for establish-
ments, we used a 60 percent criterion). Happily, this was never the case. In
other words, whenever there was a complete mass exit from some ﬁrm or
establishment code, the exiters were dispersed to a lot of other ﬁrm or es-
tablishment codes. Therefore, these exits do not simply reﬂect a change in
the ﬁrm code caused by, for example, change in ownership.
For the year pair 1989 to 1990, it was impossible to compute a reliable
estimate of mobility between ﬁrms, as a comprehensive overhaul of coding
practices took place between these years, as explained in the preceding. For
the other years, the numbers should be comparable. As seen in table 5.3, the
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Table 5.3 Probability of ﬁrm and establishment exits of white-collar workers in
ﬁrms that belong to the Confederation of Finnish Industry






















2001 0.22 0.28exit rates increased substantially after the mid-1980s. The exit rates were
highest during the recession years in the beginning of 1990s, but seem to
remain above the prerecession level even in the end of the century.
We turn next to mobility between tasks. For those who do not change
employer or establishment, the probability of a task change (occupation
change) is reported in table 5.4. Because task changes are mostly associ-
ated with above-average earnings growth, we also call them “promotions,”
although clearly they may be demotions as well. Even though the promo-
tion rates are exceptionally high in 1992, 1998, and 1997, no clear trend can
be seen in table 5.4.
5.8 Job and Promotion Flows and Salary Changes
After documenting the levels of interﬁrm and intertask mobility, we use
these data to describe diﬀerentials in wage increases with respect to these
events. Throughout the following comparisons, we have deﬁned an indi-
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Table 5.4 Incidence of promotions with unchanged ﬁrm and unchanged
establishment of white-collar workers in ﬁrms that belong to the
Confederation of Finnish Industry
Probability of occupation changes























Note: n.a.   not available.vidual’s wage growth as the ratio of the money wage increase to the aver-
age of base year and subsequent year wage:
(1)
Figure 5.3 displays the mean year-to-year real salary increases for two
groups of employees: those who remain with their employers and those
who change to another ﬁrm in the register. When comparing these ﬁgures
to those of other countries, it is important to bear in mind that we have no
information on those who jump to ﬁrms outside the manufacturing indus-
try. We have subtracted the increase of the consumer price index from the
mean salary increase for each group so that these numbers tell the increase
in the real earnings level.
There are quite large swings in the average growth of real earnings, as the
numbers vary between –4 and  8 percent. Thus, in the early phases of the
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Fig. 5.3 Real wage increases for job stayers and job exiters; monthly salaries, in-
cluding all bonuses, of white-collar workers working full time in a ﬁrm that belongs
to the Confederation of Finnish Industry (TT)1990s recession, average real salaries shrank. The general picture is that
salary growth is more rapid for the job changers, but this diﬀerential shrinks
to zero when the economy is in the deep recession of the early 1990s.
Figure 5.4, in turn, reports salary growth rates for three groups: all job
stayers, those job stayers whose occupation code changes, and those who
stay under their base year occupation code. Again, the curves are not very
surprising: those who change occupation probably get promoted in most
cases, and they do better than the rest. In the depression years, the diﬀer-
ence is tiny, but it becomes quite large after year 1995. For many years the
“non-promoted job stayers” dotted line corresponds exactly to the “all job
stayers” continuous line and is therefore not visible in the ﬁgure.
It is an obvious hypothesis that job changers or task changers may face
higher variability in their earnings growth. Table 5.5 reports the standard
deviation of salary changes in all of the ﬁve groups discussed here: all indi-
viduals, those who stay with their employer, those who change employer,
and, ﬁnally, two subsets of those who stay with the ﬁrm: the ones whose
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Fig. 5.4 Real wage increases for all job stayers, promoted job stayers, and 
nonpromoted job stayers; monthly salaries, including all bonuses, of white-collar
workers working full time in a ﬁrm that belongs to the Confederation of Finnish
Industry (TT)task changes and the ones with an unchanged task. As expected, those who
change occupation or employer are, in general, exposed to higher variation
of earnings growth.
These diﬀerences between groups may seem relatively low, and it is clear
that they conceal important diﬀerences between the age groups. We know
from the economic literature that younger employees typically gain more
by changing jobs or occupations. Thus, repeating the same exercise sepa-
rately for all age groups but aggregating over all years should yield addi-
tional information. Such a computation is reported in ﬁgure 5.5. For that
ﬁgure, we have used the entire panel of employees and computed a similar
breakdown of salary increases in the groups of ﬁrm stayers, ﬁrm changers,
and ﬁrm stayers who change occupation (we leave out the curve for all em-
ployees because it is almost identical to that of ﬁrm stayers whose occupa-
tion is unchanged). A clear pattern emerges: young workers gain a lot by
changing employers, but also by being promoted within the ﬁrm. After age
ﬁfty, promotions and job exits hardly make any diﬀerence, and, for the old-
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Table 5.5 Standard deviation of variation of monthly changes, including all
bonuses, of white-collar workers working full time in a ﬁrm that belongs
to the Confederation of Finnish Industry
Workers
Occupation Occupation 
Year All Stayers Changers changes unchanged
1980–1981 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.06
1981–1982 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.06
1982–1983 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.06
1983–1984 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.06
1984–1985 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.06
1985–1986 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.06
1986–1987 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.06
1987–1988 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.06
1988–1989 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.07
1989–1990 0.08 n.a n.a. n.a. n.a.
1990–1991 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.06
1991–1992 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.04
1992–1993 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.06
1993–1994 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.06
1994–1995 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07
1995–1996 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.06
1996–1997 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.07
1997–1998 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.07
1998–1999 0.09 0.09 0.12 n.a. n.a.
1999–2000 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.09
2000–2001 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.08
2001–2002 0.09 0.09 0.11 n.a. n.a.
Note: n.a.   not available.est workers, being allocated to new tasks within the ﬁrm is associated with
a drop in real earnings.
5.9 The Variance of Wage Increases
As far as the “tightness” of the collective agreement system is concerned,
one of the most interesting questions is the extent to which individual ﬁrms
can steer their internal pay structures and to what extent they are just com-
pelled to keep the existing pay structure and pay the general increase to
everybody.
To shed light on this, ﬁgure 5.6 reports an ANOVA decomposition of
yearly salary increases, with ﬁrm indicators as the conditioning variable, as
in the computations reported in tables 5.1 and 5.2. We can see a slow in-
crease in the overall variance of salary increases. As to the share of salary
increase variation explained by ﬁrm indicators, one might also detect a
Finland: Firm Factors in Wages and Wage Changes 169
Fig. 5.5 Real wage increases according to age for all job stayers, job changers, 
and promoted job stayers; monthly salaries, including all bonuses, of white-collar
workers working full time in a ﬁrm that belongs to the Confederation of Finnish
Industry (TT)weak but increasing trend, but it is overwhelmed by upward and downward
movements that seem to be associated with the outcome of centralization
eﬀorts. There were no centralized wage agreements in years 1993 and 1994.
In the boom years of the late 1990s, economic policymakers again resorted
to coordinated wage settlements in order to put a brake on inﬂation, and
we can see a corresponding downward shift in the ﬁrm variance compo-
nent in these years.
These shifts in the ﬁrm salary increase diﬀerentials are partly based on
shifts in interindustry diﬀerentials in salary increases: when there is no cen-
tralized agreement on a general pay increase, diﬀerent industries imple-
ment diﬀerent pay increases that might still be fairly uniform between
ﬁrms. However, as is apparent from ﬁgure 5.6, the interindustry diﬀeren-
tials do not account for a large part of the pay increase variance, even in
those years when the interﬁrm diﬀerentials are large. The shifts in the vari-
ance component of industry diﬀerentials are far weaker.
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Fig. 5.6 ANOVA for salary increases: The standard deviation of salary increases
for job stayers and the share of variance (R-squared) explained by ﬁrm indicators
and industry indicators; monthly salaries, including all bonuses, of white-collar
workers working full time in a ﬁrm that belongs to the Confederation of Finnish
Industry (TT)Thus, one natural interpretation of the result is that noncentralized
rounds do, in general, result in higher pay increases in all the industries.
This is also the result obtained by Uusitalo in an earlier study (2005). How-
ever, as we see a much stronger upward shift in the ﬁrm variance compo-
nent in those very same years in which there is no centralized agreement, it
seems that these industrywide agreements are written in such a way that
they leave more room at ﬁrm-speciﬁc arrangements.
Thus, seen from the point of view of individual ﬁrms, noncentralized in-
dustry agreements are a mixed bag. They lead to more ﬁrm-speciﬁc ad-
justment in wages, but they also result in higher overall pay increases,
which is probably particularly disadvantageous for those ﬁrms that suﬀer
from below-average labor productivity growth. This is a classic feature of
Nordic pay-bargaining models: they reward ﬁrms with high productivity
growth, as local wage claims are controlled by central organizations, but
they penalize entrepreneurs whose productivity growth is below average.
Anyway, we see that quite substantial shifts in variance components can
occur within an unchanged institutional framework for wage determina-
tion. This does not mean that wage increases would be particularly ﬁrm
speciﬁc in an international comparison. However, it shows that the ﬁrms
can to some extent at least use wage changes as individual incentives and
group incentives within a pay-bargaining system that aims at steering the
overall pace of wage change.
5.10 Job and Occupation Transitions and Career Proﬁles
Finally, we characterize the career dynamics of a couple of cohorts of
new entrants into the industry. We select two cohorts, one that enters the
industry in 1981 and another that enters in 1987. We select all the entrants
that were under thirty-ﬁve years of age in the initial year and who were not
observable in the panel in the year preceding the initial year. From these co-
horts, we further select all those who are observed in the industry for eleven
consecutive years after the initial year. For each individual, we compute the
sum of job changes within a current employer (promotion) and a change of
employer (job exit). We measure the eﬀect of such cumulated changes on
the relative position of the employee. To this end, we start the analysis by
computing, for each employee, his or her percentile rank in each year in the
aggregate salary distribution. Note that we have used the entire salaried
employee workforce to compute these ranks, not only the chosen cohort.
Our career variable is then the gain in the relative position of the em-
ployee during the eleven years of interest. This procedure abstracts from
aggregate productivity and inﬂation shocks and other business-cycle phe-
nomena and focuses solely on the relative performance of the employees.
We report two tables for both cohorts, one that reports the average rela-
tive position improvement as a function of promotions and job changes,
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the average increase in the relative position of the employees in the 1981 co-
hort. In each cell, the number in parentheses displays the standard devia-
tion of the relative position change for that particular exits-promotion
combination. The next table, table 5.7 reports the headcounts of all pro-
motion-job exit combinations, from year 1981 to 1991. As one can see by
comparing the two tables, we do not report the mean and standard devia-
tion estimates for cells with less than ﬁve individuals.
The next tables, tables 5.8 and 5.9, report a similar exercise for the 1987
cohort.
For the earlier cohort, it seems clear that about four employer changes
plus a few promotions lead to a high relative salary gain. The most inter-
esting diﬀerence between the two cohorts has to do with the ﬁrst column of
tables 5.6 and 5.8. For the earlier cohort, it was not that advantageous to
change employer many times without being promoted in the ﬁrm. This tells
of a more traditional economy, in which tenure and internal career prog-
ress play a main role. The latter cohort has experienced the large interﬁrm
mobility of the 1995 to 1997 recovery years, and for that cohort it is pos-
sible to improve one’s performance a lot by changing employer but without
any promotions.
We also note that the standard deviation ﬁgures are quite high, although
one has to bear in mind that they are not directly related to uncertainty as
to the money salary: we measure progress by the person’s position in the
distribution, and in the thick parts of the salary distribution, it is, of course,
easier to move a lot in the salary distribution of employees without the
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Table 5.6 Cohort relative wage gains as a function of job changes (vertical direction
downward) and internal promotions (horizontal direction) of white-collar
workers who entered the industry in 1981
No. of promotions within ﬁrm
No. of exits 012345 6 7
0–2 9 (15) 13 (25) 18 (21) 21 (28) 17 (29) 27 (29)
3 10 (18) 15 (23) 14 (27) 25 (29) 26 (36)
4 14 (24) 21 (25) 20 (26) 30 (23)
5 12 (25) 20 (30) 23 (29) 24 (11)
6 14 (30) 22 (31) 28 (20)
7 18 (19) 4 (30)
8
9
Notes: Each entry in the table reports the average percentile increase (standard deviation in
brackets) within the wage distribution. For example, the ﬁrst entry in the top left corner of the
table shows that between 1981 and 1992 the worker who changed employee never, once, or
twice and was not promoted while working with the same employer increased his or her rela-
tive position, on average, by 9 percentage points of the wage distribution.Table 5.7 Cohort headcounts according to number of job changes (vertical direction
downward) and internal promotions (horizontal direction) of white-collar
workers who entered the industry in 1981
No. of promotions within ﬁrm
No. of exits 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0–2 690 425 199 73 23 8 1 1
3 464 341 104 47 10 5 0 0
4 218 132 47 19 1 0 1 0
5 9 38 32 770 1 0 0
6 4 02 1 711 0 0 0
7 9 8 300 0 0 0
8 2 0 000 0 0 0
9 0 1 000 0 0 0
Notes:Each entry reports the number of individuals whi experience a particular combination
of employer changes and promotions. For example, there are 464 people who changed em-
ployer thrice but were never promoted within one employer.
Table 5.8 1987 cohort relative wage gains as a function of job changes (vertical
direction downward) and internal promotions (horizontal direction)
No. of promotions within ﬁrm
No. of exits 01234 5 6 7
0–2 13 (14) 20 (15) 23 (19) 28 (20) 34 (25)
3 18 (17) 24 (19) 32 (22) 38 (21)
4 21 (18) 26 (18) 27 (20)
5 25 (17) 28 (23) 29 (25)
6 35 (22) 34 (13)
7
8
Note: See tables 5.6 and 5.7 notes.
Table 5.9 1987 cohort headcounts according to number of job changes (vertical
direction downward) and internal promotions (horizontal direction)
No. of promotions within ﬁrm
No. of exits 0 1 2 3 4567
0 – 2 3 2 71 6 19 23 56001
3 2 5 11 6 15 91 55000
4 1 3 8 7 14 7 53000
5 4 3 2 71 1 50000
6 1 9 1 0 4 00000
7 2 3 0 00000
8 1 0 0 00000
Note: See table 5.7 notes.salary changing a lot. This notwithstanding, the standard deviations are
quite high—even the groups of individuals who have mostly stayed with
the same employer and have experienced several promotions have, on av-
erage, a standard deviation of the career measure variable that is of the
same order of magnitude as the value of the measure variable itself.
5.11 New Pay Forms and Pay Flexibility
We have so far conﬁned our analyses to a narrowly deﬁned base monthly
salary. In the 1990s, new pay forms related to ﬁrm proﬁts or some group or
ﬁrm performance measures became increasingly popular in Finnish man-
ufacturing. This may be due to at least two factors. Production technologies
may evolve in a way that makes the measurement of individual perfor-
mance more diﬃcult at the same time when productivity becomes increas-
ingly dependent on group performance. Another motivation for an in-
creased use of performance-related pay may be disinﬂation: when inﬂation
is low, maintaining a given downward real wage ﬂexibility necessitates a
higher propensity of nominal pay cuts (see Macleod and Malcomson
1993). Pay cuts are probably easier to carry out for such pay components
as performance pay and proﬁt sharing as they are not regulated by collec-
tive agreements and are at the discretion of management.
In the context of this chapter, one would expect that such new pay forms
would also increase the ﬁrm-speciﬁc component in wage variation. We il-
lustrate this with a table on the incidence of nominal pay cuts, computed
for both narrowly deﬁned monthly salary and the total salary, which is a
sum of the narrow salary and eventual performance pay.
Table 5.10 shows that this eﬀect can be quite important for salaried em-
ployees. In a similar vein, if we carry out an analysis of variance, similar to
that reported for wage increases but this time taking into account new per-
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Table 5.10 Probability of a wage cut from base year to next and the coeﬃcient of
variation of pay changes, both computed for narrow and wide pay, job
stayers of monthly salaries of white-collar workers working in a ﬁrm that
belongs to the Confederation of Finnish Industry
Prob(salary cut) and CV(salary change), job stayers
Year Salary no PP Salary with PP CV(salary no PP) CV(with PP)
1996–1997 0.04 0.13 2.10 2.06
1997–1998 0.02 0.07 1.21 1.23
1998–1999 0.04 0.14 1.45 1.63
1999–2000 0.02 0.06 1.04 1.11
Notes: Prob   probability; CV   coeﬃcient of variation. Columns “with PP” indicate the
performance-related pay components that are typically based on the ﬁrm’s economic result in
the previous year.formance pay schemes, we see that these new pay schemes greatly reinforce
the move to a larger ﬁrm speciﬁcity of wage changes.
This trend is not general, however: for hourly paid blue-collar workers,
there is no such eﬀect, and the incidence of pay cuts is fairly high to start
with. This is shown in table 5.11, in which we report the same exercise 
for blue-collar workers. There is much more downward ﬂexibility in the
worker wages to start with, and the introduction of performance pay
schemes does not mean a momentous change in this respect.
5.12 Conclusions
We have surveyed the wage structure and wage dynamics of Finnish
manufacturing employees in the last twenty-two years. One interesting
background factor for this analysis is that the institutions of the wage bar-
gaining system have hardly changed at all in that period. Consequently, we
can regard the structural changes that we detect in the empirical material
as due to the behavior of ﬁrms and individuals instead of institutional re-
forms.
In our view, the most important stylized facts that emerge out of these
analyses are the following:
• The overall cross-section variance of salaries has changed very little.
This is true for the distribution of ﬁnal salaries but almost true even for
salary residuals.
• In the 1980s, diﬀerences in the mean salaries of ﬁrms were very low.
This was true both for ﬁnal salaries as well as residuals after the sal-
aries were projected to conventional Mincer-type regressors like edu-
cation, age, and gender.
• The diﬀerentials between ﬁrms started to increase at the end of the
1980s, and this process accelerated after the deep slump of the 1990s.
In other words, salaries became more ﬁrm speciﬁc.
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Table 5.11 Probability of a wage cut from base year to next and the coeﬃcient of
variation of pay changes, both computed for narrow and wide pay, job
stayers of hourly wages of blue-collar workers in ﬁrms that belong to the
Confederation of Finnish Industry
Prob(wage cut) and CV(wage change), job stayers
Year Timewage Timewage with PP CV(timewage) CV(timewage with PP)
1996–1997 0.22 0.21 1.88 1.81
1997–1998 0.19 0.19 1.60 1.52
1998–1999 0.25 0.27 2.06 2.13
1999–2000 0.15 0.15 1.31 1.28
Note: See table 5.10 notes.• A large part of this increased importance of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variance
component is explained by a stronger sorting of employees according
to productive characteristics.
• The increased importance of diﬀerentials between ﬁrm holds true
even for Mincer wage residuals. In other words, there are more ﬁrm-
speciﬁc wage diﬀerentials between similar individuals who work in
diﬀerent ﬁrms.
• A slight but similar development has taken place for the distribution
of salary increases. Firm diﬀerentials in salary increases are more im-
portant now than in the 1980s. However, this trend is not monotone.
• Salary increase diﬀerentials between ﬁrms increase markedly when
there is no centralized wage agreement. Firm diﬀerentials in salary in-
creases were particularly large in the mid-1990s when no centralized
agreements on salary increases were concluded, but they diminished
again when centralized incomes policy again became operative from
year 1996 onward.
• Salary increases diﬀer between those who stay and those who leave a
ﬁrm. In recessions, that diﬀerence is not large, but leavers do better in
times of boom.
• A similar characterization holds for those who change occupation
within a ﬁrm. In general, occupation changers increase their pay more
than those who stay in their occupation.
• Both of the aforementioned eﬀects depend starkly on age. Firm exits
and promotions increase earnings up to the age of ﬁfty years, after
which such events do not, on average, improve a person’s relative po-
sition.
• Finally, an analysis of individual careers over eleven years revealed
that both exits and promotions play a role in salary growth. The vari-
ance of individual ﬁnal pay after a career of ten years is large. Macro-
economic conditions can dramatically aﬀect the expected pay and the
variance of pay over the career span of an individual. After the deep
slump of the early 1990s, employer changes even without internal pro-
motions might have become a more attractive career pattern.
To sum up, wage setting is becoming a bit more ﬁrm speciﬁc, while cen-
tralized agreements on pay increases continue to be the main force that
aﬀects the growth in average pay. This kind of modest evolution toward
more ﬁrm-speciﬁc pay ﬁrm seems to be well accommodated by the institu-
tional and legal framework of pay bargaining.
There is no necessary contradiction between these trends of more mi-
croﬂexibility and macrocentralization. Indeed, according to some ac-
counts, they would be a rational response to the economic environment.
Recent theoretical research on the interplay of central bank policy and
176 Roope Uusitalo and Juhana Vartiainenwage bargaining suggests that the advent of the euro makes it even more
important to coordinate the wage claims of unions. This conclusion has
come out of several papers (see Coricelli, Cukierman, and Dalmazzo 2000;
Holden 2005). The authors of these papers argue that the introduction of
the single currency means that monetary policy becomes more accommo-
dating from the point of view of national wage setters. This means that the
incentives to coordinate wage claims increases, as there is no national cen-
tral bank anymore that would discipline wage setters by threatening with
high interest rates if wage claims are excessive. The same point has been
made in the empirical industrial relations literature. Anke Hassel (2002)
notes that European governments have been keen to use the collective wage
bargaining system to get a better macroeconomic grip on average wage
growth.
At the same time, it is not surprising that ﬁrms want to increase the scope
for their speciﬁc personnel policies and wage schemes. As the importance
of sheer physical labor recedes and production processes become more
complicated, it becomes more important for the ﬁrm to introduce increas-
ingly sophisticated incentive schemes. This means that pay is increasingly
conditioned on team performance, which warrants the introduction of
performance pay or even proﬁt sharing. In our blue-collar register data, for
example, we can observe a steady decrease in the share of pure individual
piece-rate work and a corresponding increase in partial piece-rate or pre-
mium pay that is often based on team performance. Such trends in pro-
duction techniques make it increasingly important for ﬁrms to design so-
phisticated incentive structures.
Against these two general trends, the gradual increase in microﬂexibility
within the conﬁnes of an otherwise centralized macroeconomic control of
wage increases might be at least a reasonable second-best reaction to eco-
nomic circumstances. In this respect, Finland is hardly alone among the
small European countries, of course. Recent institutional developments in
Sweden tell a similar story: collective agreements are increasingly written
so that relative wage diﬀerentials at the ﬁrm level are left to local negotia-
tions, while the macroeconomic control of the speed of wage increases is
tightened with the help of new neocorporatist institutions like the new Na-
tional Mediation Oﬃce.7 In the Netherlands, typical wage bargains also
keep a centralized control of general wage increases but otherwise leave
wage determination to the local level.8
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7. This new organization was established in year 2000, and its aim is to enhance bargaining
coordination and set guidelines for reasonable wage settlements.
8. See Teulings and Hartog (1998) for a sophisticated theoretical rationale of the Dutch
wage bargaining model, not unlike the arguments that we have advanced in this paper.References
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